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Bargaining with entropy and energy
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Statistical mechanics is based on interplay between energy minimization and entropy maximiza-
tion. Here we formalize this interplay via axioms of cooperative game theory (Nash bargaining) and
apply it out of equilibrium. These axioms capture basic notions related to joint maximization of
entropy and minus energy, formally represented by utilities of two different players. We predict ther-
malization of a non-equilibrium statistical system employing the axiom of affine covariance—related
to the freedom of changing initial points and dimensions for entropy and energy—together with
the contraction invariance of the entropy-energy diagram. Whenever the initial non-equilibrium
state is active, this mechanism allows thermalization to negative temperatures. Demanding a sym-
metry between players fixes the final state to a specific positive-temperature (equilibrium) state.
The approach solves an important open problem in the maximum entropy inference principle, viz.
generalizes it to the case when the constraint is not known precisely.
Interplay between entropy and energy is fundamental
for equilibrium statistical mechanics [1–5]. The inter-
play is based on the fact that the equilibrium (positive-
temperature) Gibbs distribution can be obtained via
maximizing entropy for a fixed energy, or via minimizing
energy for a fixed entropy [1–5]. The entropy maximiza-
tion reflects the tendency of an isolated system towards
maximal disorder. The energy minimization relates to
finding a more stable (passive) state [4].
Here we show that the competition between entropy
and energy can be formalized via axioms of cooperative
game theory (bargaining) [7–9] and applied out of equilib-
rium. Now entropy S and minus energy U = −E are pay-
offs of two players that tend to maximize them “simulta-
neously”; see Table I of [10] for a game theory—statistical
physics dictionary. While non-cooperative game theory
focuses on rational actions to be chosen given payoffs
only, the bargaining provides an axiomatic description
of interaction between the players that should reach a
compromise [6–8]. Hence bargaining is suitable for for-
malizing interaction mechanisms to be applied in physics
[11]. We apply it when known thermodynamic principles
do not suffice for predicting system’s behavior. Given
a non-equilibrium initial state with entropy larger than
kB ln 2, and using certain plausible axioms on the relax-
ation process, we can show that the final state is an
equilibrium one, with the sign of temperature depend-
ing on the initial state. The final state is fixed to a spe-
cific positive-temperature state, if the symmetry between
players is assumed. Thus we derive thermalization via
game theory. As an application of our results we resolve
a major open problem in the maximum entropy inference
method [12, 13] generalizing it to those cases, where the
constraint is not known precisely.
Entropy-energy diagram. We study a classical system
with discrete states i = 1, ..n and respective energies
{εi}
n
i=1. A statistical (generally non-equilibrium) state
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FIG. 1: A typical example of entropy-energy diagram. En-
tropy is S and the minus energy U = −E for 4-level system
with energies: ε1 = 0, ε2 = 1, ε3 = 2.5, and ε4 = 3. Maximal
(minimal) entropy curves are denoted by blue (black). All
physically acceptable values of entropy and energy are inside
of the domain bounded by blue and black curves. States be-
low red dashed lines (both are lower than ln 2) are excluded
by Axiom 2. Green dashed line shows Uav = −
1
4
∑
4
k=1
εk;
it separates β > 0 from β < 0; cf. (4). Black point denotes
a possible initial state. States inside dashed blue lines hold
axiom 4. Magenta lines denote initial states that produce the
same final state (9).
of the system is given by probabilities
{pi ≥ 0}
n
i=1,
∑n
i=1
pi = 1. (1)
The entropy and minus average energy for such a state
read, respectively [1–5]:
S[p] = −kB
∑n
i=1
pi ln pi, U [p] = −
∑n
i=1
εipi, (2)
where kB is Boltzmann’s constant. The Gibbsian equi-
librium states are obtained by maximizing S[p] over (1)
under a fixed U = U [p] [1–5]:
πi = e
−βεi/Z, Z =
∑n
i=1
e−βεi , β = 1/(kBT ), (3)
2where the inverse temperature β is uniquely determined
from U [p] = U . The same result—but restricted to the
positive-temperature branch β > 0—is obtained upon
maximizing U [p] under fixed S [4, 5]. This is why we fre-
quently employ the minus energy together with entropy:
both are maximized in equilibrium.
Fig. 1 shows a typical entropy-energy diagram on the
(U, S) plane. The maximum entropy curve S(U) holds
S(Uav) = lnn, Uav ≡ −
1
n
∑n
k=1
εk. (4)
For U > Uav (U < Uav) S(U) refers to β > 0 (β < 0).
No probabilistic states are possible below the minimum
entropy curve Smin(U) = minp, U [p]=U (S[p]). The max-
imum entropy curve is smooth and bounds a convex
domain due to concavity of S[p] [0 < ǫ < 1] [4, 5]:
S[ǫp+(1−ǫ)q] ≥ ǫS[p]+(1−ǫ)S[q]. Now Smin(U) is an ir-
regular curve, because minima of a concave function S[p]
are reached for vertices of the allowed probability domain
that combines (1) with constraint U [p] = U . Hence only
two probabilities are non-zero; see §1 of [10] for details.
We have [cf. Fig. 1]:
Smin(U) ≤ kB ln 2, Smin(−εi) = 0. (5)
Statement of the problem. We emphasize that all above
features of the entropy-energy diagram hold for arbitrary
large, but finite values of n. Let the statistical system be
found initially at some point of the entropy-energy di-
agram. We want to predict the long-time state of this
system, knowing that its entropy and minus energy tend
not to decrease. An example of this situation is when a
thermally isolated statistical system is subject to exter-
nal fields that extract energy. (Recall that any process
is thermally isolated if the environment is included into
the system.) Now in two extreme cases thermodynam-
ics can determine the long-time state [1–3]: firstly, if the
work-extraction process is very slow, then the entropy
is conserved and work-extraction entails decreasing en-
ergy. Consequently, through the extraction of as much
work as possible, the system will finally reach equilib-
rium along the constant entropy [1–3]. Secondly, when no
work-extraction is present and the system is completely
isolated, its entropy will increase till it finally reaches
equilibrium along the constant energy path.
Now what if both processes occur simultaneously, i.e.
when both entropy and minus energy increase, can one
still show that the system will reach a thermal equilib-
rium? If yes, can one bound its temperature?
The standard thermodynamics cannot answer these
two questions due to insufficient information. (E.g. it
can predict the final state (3) if we know that the system
is attached to a thermal bath at inverse temperature β;
but we do not make such an assumption.) The questions
can be answered within more detailed, non-equilibrium
statistical mechanical theories [4, 5]. But such theories
make a number of dynamical assumptions, e.g. they as-
sume that internal constituents of the system move ac-
cording to quantum Hamiltonian dynamics during the
whole system’s evolution [4, 5]. Or they assume that the
systems is of hydrodynamic type with smooth density,
velocity and pressure fields [1]. The direct validity of
such assumptions is difficult to address, hence a specific
axiomatic approach is required [23].
Here we address the above question via axioms of bar-
gaining games [6–8]; see Table I of [10] for a detailed
comparison between bargaining theory and statistical
physics. Given the initial state (Ui, Si), we look for the
final state (Uf , Sf) = (U [p f ], S[p f ]). Axioms below will
determine this final state on the entropy-energy diagram.
Axiom 1: Once both S and U tend to increase, then
at least one of them should increase to some extent:
Ui ≤ Uf , Si ≤ Sf , (6)
where at least one inequality is strict. In game theory
(6) relates to individual rationality of players [8, 9].
Axiom 2: The choice of initial conditions. We shall as-
sume a non-equilibrium initial (probabilistic) state, with
entropy Si > kB ln 2. This is a class of sufficiently macro-
scopic states for our purposes. In concrete cases this
condition can be made weaker; e.g. for the case of Fig. 1
we can allow all initial states above dotted red lines. Now
Axioms 1 and 2 ensure that the domain of allowed final
states on the entropy-energy diagram is a convex set.
Axiom 3: Affine-covariance. If the entropy-energy di-
agram (U, S) (including (Ui, Si)) is transformed as
(U, S)→ (a−1U + d, b−1S + c), a > 0, b > 0, (7)
where c and d are arbitrary, then the final state is trans-
formed via the same rule (7) [7]. The freedom to translate
energy and entropy by an arbitrary amount is well-known
in physics; hence the factors c and d in (7). In (7), a and
b account for the fact of different dimensions for S[p] and
U [p] [cf. (2)], and the possibility of changing those di-
mensions without changing physics. We shall apply (7)
also for dimensionless a and b.
Axiom 4: Contraction invariance (Independence of ir-
relevant alternatives) [7]. LetD′ is a subset of the original
entropy-energy phase-diagram D, and D′ contains both
(Si, Ui) and (Sf , Uf). If now the set of allowed final states
is restricted (contracted) from D to D′, then it still holds
that (Ui, Si, )→ (Uf , Sf).
Axiom 4 tells about any subset D′, but below we shall
need it only for full-measure, well-behaved subsets that
are similar to D. The restriction to those subsets can be
realized via suitable external fields.
Contraction invariance plays an important role in de-
cision theory [6–8]. The intuition behind this axiom is
physical: it assumes that the actual evolution (Ui, Si)→
(Uf , Sf) amounts to selecting the “best” state via binary
comparisons of diagram points. Hence restricting the set
3of alternatives—provided that the “best” states is still
allowed—cannot change the “best”.
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FIG. 2: The set of states in coordinates (8) for Ui > Uav
(black and green curves) and Ui < Uav (dotted and dashed
blue curves). In both cases the initial state is shifted to (0, 0)
via (7). F and G are tentative final states for (resp.) first
and second scenario.
Thermalization. We have two possibilities for the ini-
tial state (Ui, Si) [see (4) and Fig. 2, 1]: Ui ≥ Uav or
Ui < Uav. Both scenarios are studied in coordinates
u = U − Ui, s = S − Si, (8)
which is done by (7) with a = b = 1; see Fig. 2.
For Ui ≥ Uav, all points on and below the maximum
entropy curve BA [apart of (0, 0)] are allowed as possi-
ble final states; see (6) and Fig. 2. Assume that the final
state F ≡ (u¯, s¯) 6∈ BA; cf. Fig. 2. Then there is a point
F1 = (a1u¯, b1s¯), with a1 ≥ 1 and b1 ≥ 1 (at least one
of these inequalities is strict). We now apply (7) with
a = a1, b = b1, and c = d = 0 to all point of the diagram.
This transforms F1 → F, and changes the original do-
main D = OBA [(0, 0) = O] to smaller domain D′ ⊂ D;
see Fig. 2, where D′ is below the green line. Now F ∈ D′,
due to F1 → F. But we can regard D
′ as just a subset of
∈ D and apply to it Axiom 4. We now have 2 contradict-
ing facts: following Axiom 4, F should not change when
going to a subset. But it should change, F→ F2 accord-
ing to (7), i.e. Axiom 3. The contradiction is avoided
only if F is located on the maximum entropy curve BA
[9].
For Ui < Uav, we can apply (7) only with a = 1 and
b > 1 (c = d = 0). Otherwise, D′ 6⊂ D—see Fig. 2 for
an example—and then Axiom 4 does not apply. Hence
given a tentative final state G = (u¯, s¯) we can reach the
above contradiction only if there is a point G1 = (u¯, bs¯);
see Fig. 2. I.e. the set of possible final states coincides
with curve BC in Fig. 2. Note that for this conclusion
we should slightly modify Axiom 1: Ui > Uf ; cf. (6).
Hence Axioms 1 − 4 imply thermalization: the fi-
nal state is on the maximum entropy curve. Negative-
temperature states are allowed by this derivation for Ui <
Uav. Such initial states are active, i.e. (pi−pj)(εi−εj) >
0 at least for one pair (i, j).
More information on the final state is contained in
Axiom 5: Symmetry: We made U and S dimension-
less via (7). If the domain of allowed final states (6) is
symmetric—i.e. it contains a point (U, S) if and only if
it contains (S,U)—and so is the initial state (Ui = Si),
then the final state is also symmetric (Sf , Sf), provided
that there are no reasons to regard the players asymmet-
rically.
Nash [6] and his followers [8] argued that the only final
state satisfying axioms 1− 5 is
(UN, SN) = argmax(U,S) [(U − Ui)(S − Si)] , (9)
where the maximum is reached on the maximum entropy
curve restricted by (6). Since this curve is concave, the
argmax in (9) is unique; see §2.1 of [10]. Eq. (9) shows
that (UN, SN) refer to a βN > 0; cf. (3).
However, Refs. [6, 8] derive (9) by making an addi-
tional assumption, viz. the domain restricted by (6) can
enlarged into a larger domain; see §2.2 of [10] for details.
We cannot employ this assumption, since it is completely
unphysical. We shall derive (9) using axioms 1 − 5, but
without the assumption. Fig. 3 shows a typical example
of the maximal entropy curve s(u)—denoted by BA in
Fig. 3—in coordinates (8) with O ≡ (0, 0). The domain
of states BAO allowed by Axiom 1 is not symmetric in
the sense of Axiom 5. But it has the largest symmet-
ric subset OBKC ⊂ OBA, where K is the solution of
s(uˆ) = uˆ, and KC is the inverse function s−1(u) of s(u);
see Fig. 3. For OBKC Axiom 5 + thermalization lead
to K as the final state. Hence for the original domain
BAO the final state is located on the line KA (possibly
including K); see Axiom 4 and the result that the final
state is located on BA. In coordinates (8) the state (9)
is given as (uN , s(uN)) with uN = argmaxu[us(u)]. This
is the point N on Fig. 3. Now N ∈ KA, as seen from
working out concave function s(u) for u ≃ uˆ:
us(u)− uˆs(uˆ) = uˆ(u− uˆ)[ 1 + s′(uˆ) ], (10)
s(u)− s−1(u) =
[
s′(uˆ)2 − 1
]
(u− uˆ) / s′(uˆ) , (11)
where s′(u) = ds/du and factors O[(u − uˆ)2] were ne-
glected. Now for −1 < s′(u) < 0 we have the situation
shown on Fig. 3, where uN > uˆ and s(u) > s
−1(u) for
u > uˆ. For −1 > s′(u) we have the analogue of Fig. 3,
where uN < uˆ, and the solution is located on BK. For
1 > s′(uˆ) > 0, we always get uN > uˆ.
The same restricting of the final state will be done
after transformation (7) with b = 1 and c = d = 0, where
s(u)→ s(au). We choose a = a0 such that
argmaxu[u s(a0u) ] = uˆ0, uˆ0 = s(a0uˆ0), (12)
4i.e. the transformed Nash solution (9) equals uˆ0. Con-
sider (7) under two other values of a: a2 > a0 > a1;
see Fig. 3. When applying (7) with a = a2, the trans-
formed Nash solution lies on BK2. On that curve, the
final state lies between K1 and K2. Going back to the
original curve KA, we restrict the final state to lay be-
tween K and n2 on KA. Applying (7) with a = a1, we
further restrict the final state to lay between n1 and n2;
see Fig. 3. For a1 → a0 ← a2 we get n1 → N← n2, i.e.
the final state coincides with (9).
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FIG. 3: Entropy-energy diagram in coordinates (8): s(u)
(black), s(a0u) (green), s(a1u) (magenta) and s(a2u) (brown).
Retrodicting from an equilibrium state (without con-
servation laws). Given an equilibrium state (U(β), S(β))
with β > 0 we can identify it with the final state (9),
and ask which initial states give rise to it. Such a
question is possible to ask within standard thermody-
namics only if the conservation law of entropy or en-
ergy is there. Note that (UN, SN) in (9) is determined
from ddU [(U − Ui)(S(U)− Si)] = 0. This leads to a line
S−S(β) = β(U −U(β)) on the entropy-energy diagram;
see magenta lines on Fig. 1. They start from (U(β), S(β))
and end either at a boundary of the diagram, or at a
point, where the convexity of the domain is lost.
The maximum entropy method grew out of statistical
physics and is widely used in probabilistic inference [12–
14]. To recall it: probabilities (1) are not known, but
the average value U = U [p] ≡ −
∑n
k=1 pkεk of a random
quantity {−εk}
n
k=1 is known. Then the most unbiased
(least informative) probabilities that correspond to this
prior information are derived by maximizing the entropy
S[p] under U = U [p]: maxpS[p] = S(U) [13–15]. Ap-
plications of the method meet the following problem: if
{pk}
n
k=1 are not known, and U is learned from experi-
ments, then it cannot be known precisely [14, 15]; see §3
of [10] for a review of the method and the open prob-
lem. Thus we ask how is the method applied if there is
weaker prior information, i.e. the average U is not known
precisely, but we only know that it belongs to the inter-
val U ∈ [U1, U2]? For technical clarity we add another
constraint [see (4) and §3.4 of [10] for extensions]:
U ∈ [U1, U2], Uav < U1 < U2. (13)
Recall that upon (13) the same result is obtained by max-
imizing S[p] for U = U [p], or by maximizing U [p] for
S = S[p]. Note that the uncertainty (13) translates into
the uncertainty S ∈ [S1, S2] (S1 ≡ S(U1), S2 ≡ S(U2))
for the maximum entropy. For applying the bargaining
axioms—where U [p] and S[p] are two utilities that tend
to maximize simultaneously—we should define the do-
main of allowed states Ω on the (U, S)-diagram. Now Ω
is defined by joining two uncertainty intervals:
Ω = {(U¯ , S¯) | U¯ ∈ [U1, U2], S¯ ∈ [S1, S2] }. (14)
Ω has the form required by Axiom 1 with the initial point
(Ui, Si) = (U1, S2); cf. (6). Now Axioms 1−5 apply; see
§3.3 of [10] for details. Thus we deduce the bargainig
solution for the uncertainty given by (13) [cf. (9)]:
argmax(U,S) [(U − U1)(S − S2)] . (15)
In particular, Axiom 5 is natural here due to the duality
between maximizing U [p] and S[p]. Extensions of (15) to
other [than (13)] uncertainty intervals [U1, U2] are worked
in §3.4 of [10]. Elsewhere we shall explore applications of
this generalized maximum-entropy method.
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
1. Calculation of the minimum entropy for a fixed
average energy
Here we show how to mimimize entropy
Smin(E) = minpS[p], S[p] = −kB
∑n
i=1
pi ln pi, (16)
over probabilities
{pi ≥ 0}
n
i=1,
∑n
i=1
pi = 1, (17)
for a fixed average energy
E =
∑n
i=1
εipi. (18)
Energy levels {εi ≥ 0}
n
i=1 are given.
Since S[p] is concave, its minimum is reached for ver-
tices of the allowed probability domain. This domain is
defined by the intersection of (17) with probabilities that
support constraint (18). Put differently, as many prob-
abilities nullify for the minimum of S[p], as allowed by
(18). Hence at best only two probabilities are non-zero.
We now order different energies as
ε1 < ε2 < ε3..., (19)
and define entropies sij(E), where only states i and j
with i < j have non-zero probabilities:
sij(E) = −
E − εi
εj − εi
ln
E − εi
εj − εi
−
εj − E
εj − εi
ln
εj − E
εj − εi
, (20)
εi ≤ E ≤ εj . (21)
The minimum entropy Smin(E) under (18) is found by
looking—for a fixed E—at the minimum over all sij(E)
whose argument supports that value of E. E.g. Smin(E)
reads from (20) for n = 3 (3 different energies):
Smin(E) = min[ s13(E),
θ(ε2 − E)s12(E) + θ(E − ε2)s23(E) ], (22)
where θ(x) is the step-function (θ(x > 0) = 1 and θ(x <
0) = 0), and where we assume ε1 ≤ E ≤ ε3. Likewise,
for n = 4:
Smin(E) = min[ s14(E), θ(ε2 − E)s12(E)
+θ(E − ε2)θ(ε3 − E)s23(E) + θ(E − ε3)s34(E),
θ(ε2 − E)s12(E) + θ(E − ε2)s24(E),
θ(ε3 − E)s13(E) + θ(E − ε3)s34(E) ] (23)
where ε1 ≤ E ≤ ε4. Generalizations to n > 4 are guessed
from (22, 23).
2. Features of the Nash solution (9)
2.1 Concavity
Let us write (9) in coordinates (8):
uN = argmaxu[us(u) ], (24)
where (for obvious reasons) the maximization was al-
ready restricted to the maximum entropy curve s(u).
Now recall that s(u) is a concave function. Local maxima
of us(u) are found from [ dsdu ≡ s
′(u)]:
[us(u) ]′|u=uN = uNs
′(uN ) + s(uN ) = 0. (25)
Calculating
[us(u) ]′′|u=uN = −
2s(uN)
uN
+ us′′(uN ) < 0 (26)
6Bargaining theory Statistical mechanics
Utilities of players Entropy and minus energy
Joint actions of players Probabilities of states for the physical system
Feasible set of utility values Entropy-energy diagram
Defection point Initial state
Pareto set Maximum entropy curve for
positive inverse temperatures β > 0
TABLE I: Bargaining theory − statistical mechanics dictionary.
Utilities (payoffs) are normally dimensionless and are defined subjectively, via preferences of a given agent (player) [2–5].
Entropy and energy are physical, dimensional quantities [7, 8]. The player’s utility vk(x1, x2) (k = I, II denote the first and
second player, respectively) depends on the actions x1 and x2 taken by the first and second player respectively [2–4]. Entropy
and energy depend on the probability of various states of the physical system [7, 8]. Unlike actions, these probabilities do
not naturally fraction into two different components. Hence it is unclear how to apply the non-cooperative game theory to
statistical mechanics. For cooperative game theory this problem is absent, since the actions are not separated.
All utility values from the feasible set are potential outcomes of bargaining. The feasible set is normally convex and it is even
modified to be comprehensive [2–4], i.e. if (vI , vII) belongs to the feasible set, then all points (wI , wII) with wI ≤ vI and
wII ≤ vII also belong to the feasible set. The features of comprehensivity is motivated by the observation that (arbitrary)
worse utility values can be added to the existing feasible set [3, 4]. The observation is not at all obvious (or innocent) even in
the game-theoretic context [2].
The entropy-energy diagram is a well-defined physical object that does not allow any (more or less arbitrary) modification. It
is not convex due to the minimal entropy curve; see Fig. 5.
Game-theoretically, the defection point is a specific value of utilities which the players get if they fail to reach any cooperation
and/or agreement [2–4]. Normally, the defection point corresponds to guaranteed payoffs of the players. The defection point
does not have any direct physical analogy. Instead of it we need to employ the notion of the initial point that as such does not
have game-theoretic analogies (at least within axiomatic bargaining).
For a give set of utilities (vI , vII) ∈ F belonging to the feasiblity set F , the Pareto set P is defined as a subset of F such that
(vˆI , vˆII) ∈ P if there does not exist any (vI , vII) ∈ F with vI ≥ vˆI and vII ≥ vˆII , where at least one of inequalities is strict
[2–4]. Thus there are no utility values that are jointly better than any point from the Pareto set.
If (x1, x2) vary over a convex set, and if both vI(x1, x2) and vII(x1, x2) are concave functions of (x1, x2), then every point from
P can be recovered from conditional maximization of vI(x1, x2) with a fixed vII(x1, x2) or vice versa [5] (Karlin’s lemma).
Within statistical physics the Pareto line coincides with the branch of the maximum entropy curve with a positive inverse
temperatures β > 0, because this branch is also the minimum energy curve for a fixed entropy. Both entropy and energy are
concave functions of probability, and the probability itself is defined over a convex set (simplex). Hence Karlin’s lemma applies.
By analogy to the Pareto set we can define also the anti-Pareto set, which (as the opposite to the Pareto set) relates to “worst”
points of F . The anti-Pareto set P¯ is defined as a subset of F such that (v¯I , v¯II) ∈ P¯ if there does not exist any (vI , vII) ∈ F
with vI ≤ v¯I and vII ≤ v¯II , where at least one of inequalities is strict. On the entropy-energy diagram the only anti-Pareto
point coincides with (U = min[ {−εk}
n
k=1 ], S = 0). After imposing Axiom 1 and going to the new set of feasible states, the
unique anti-Pareto point coincides with the initial state.
we see that solutions uN of (25) are indeed local maxima
due to s′′(u) < 0 (concavity) and u ≥ 0, s(u) ≥ 0, as
seen from (8).
We shall now show that this local maximum is unique
and hence coincides with the global maximum. For any
concave function s(u) we have for u1 6= u2
s(u1)− s(u2) < s
′(u2)(u1 − u2), (27)
which produces after re-working and using (25) for u 6=
uN :
us(u)− uNs(uN ) < s
′(uN )(u− uN )
2
= −
s(uN )
uN
(u− uN)
2 < 0. (28)
Hence uN is the unique global maximum of us(u).
2.2 Comments on the textbook derivation of (9).
In the main text we emphasized that the derivation
of the solution (9) for the axiomatic bargaining prob-
lem that was proposed by Nash [1] and is reproduced in
textbooks [2–4] has a serious deficiency. Namely, (9) is
derived under an additional assumption, viz. that one
can enlarge the domain of allowed state on which the so-
lution is searched for. This is a drawback already in the
game-theoretic set-up, because it means that the payoffs
of the original game are (arbitrarily) modified. In con-
trast, restricting the domain of available states can be
motivated by forbiding certain probabilistic states (i.e.
joint actions of the original game), which can and should
be viewed as a possible part of negotiations into which
the players engage. For physical applications this as-
sumption is especially unwarranted, since it means that
the original (physical) entropy-energy phase diagram is
arbitrarily modified.
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FIG. 4: Entropy-energy diagram in coordinates (8). Blue
curve: s(u). The affine freedom is chosen such that the Nash
solution (9) coincides with the point (1, 1). The original do-
main of allowed states is filled in yellow. This domain is not
symmetric with respect to s = u. This is seen by looking at
the inverse function s−1(u) [red line] of s(u). The domain
below AA1 is symmetric with respect to s = u.
We now demonstrate on the example of Fig. 4 how
specifically this assumption is implemented. Fig. 4 shows
an entropy-energy diagram in relative coordinates (8)
with s(u) being the maximum entropy curve. The affine
transformation were chosen such that the Nash solution
(9) coincides with the point (1, 1). Now recall (25). Once
s(uN ) = uN = 1, then
ds(uN )
du = −1, and since s(u) is a
concave function, then all allowed states lay below the
line 2 − u; see Fig. 4. If now one considers a domain
of all states (u ≥ 0, s ≥ 0) (excluding the initial point
(0, 0)) lying below the line 2− u (this is the problematic
move!), then (1, 1) is the unique solution in that larger
domain. Moving back to the original domain and apply-
ing the contraction invariance axiom, we get that (1, 1)
is the solution of the original problem.
3. Maximum entropy method and its open problem
3.1 Maximum entropy method: a reminder
The method originated in the cross-link between infor-
mation theory and statistical mechanics [6]. It applies
well to quasi-equilibrium statistical mechanics [7, 8], and
developed to become an inference method (for recovering
unknown probabilities) with a wide range of applications;
see e.g. [7–10].
As a brief reminder: let we do not know probabilities
(17), but we happen to known that they hold a con-
straint:
U = U [p] ≡
∑n
k=1
ukpk, (29)
with {uk}
n
k=1 being realizations of some random variable
U . We refrain from calling U energy (or minus energy),
since applications of the method are general.
Now if we know precisely the average U in (29), then
unknown probabilities (17) can be recovered from maxi-
mizing the entropy (16) under constraint (29). In a well-
defined sense this amounts to minimizing the number of
assumption to be made additionally for recovering prob-
abilities [9]. The outcome of the maximization is well-
known and was already given by us in the main text:
πi = e
−βui/Z, Z =
∑n
i=1
e−βui , (30)
where the Lagrange multiplier β is determined from (29).
The method has a number of desirable features [9]. It
also has several derivations reviewed in [7–9]. Impor-
tantly, the method is independent from other inference
practices, though it does have relations with Bayesian
statistics [12–14] and causal decision making [12].
3.2 The open problem
But from where we could know U in (29) precisely?
This can happen in those (relatively rare) cases when
our knowledge is based on some symmetry or a law of
nature. Otherwise, we have to know U from a finite
number of experiments or—within subjective probability
and management science [11]—from an expert opinion.
The former method will never provide us with a precise
value of U , simply because the number of experiments is
finite. Opinions coming from experts do naturally have
certain uncertainty, or there can be at least two slightly
different expert opinions that are relevant for the decision
maker. Thus in all those case we can stick to a weaker
form of prior information, viz. that U is known to belong
to a certain interval
U ∈ [U1, U2], U1 < U2. (31)
This problem was recognized by the founder of the
method [15], who did not offer any specific solution for
it. Further studies attempted to solve the problem in
several different ways:
– Following Ref. [16], which studies the entropy maxi-
mization under more general type of constraints (not just
a fixed average), one can first fix U by (29), calculate the
maximum entropy S(U), and then maximize S(U) over
U ∈ [U1, U2], which will mean maximizing entropy (16)
under constraint (31). This produces:
maxp, U∈[U1,U2]S[p] = S(U1) for U1 ≥ Uav (32)
= S(U2) for U2 ≤ Uav (33)
= lnn for U1 < Uav < U2,(34)
Uav =
1
n
∑n
k=1
uk. (35)
8Such a solution is not acceptable; e.g. in the regime (32)
it does not change when increasing U2. I.e. the solution
does not feel the actual range of uncertainty implied in
(31).
– What is wrong with the simplest possibility that will
state S(U1+U22 )—i.e. the maximum entropy at the center
of the interval—as the solution to the problem? Taking
the arithmetic average of the interval independently from
the underlying problem seems arbitrary.
Another issue is that each value of U from the interval
[U1, U2] is mapped to the (maximum) entropy value mak-
ing up an interval of entropy values. For U1 ≥ Uav this
interval is [S2, S1], where S1 = S(U1) and S2 = S(U2).
Denoting by U(S) the inverse function of S(U), we can
take U( Sˆ1+Sˆ22 ) instead of S(
U1+U2
2 ).
– Ref. [17] assumes that (though the precise value of
the average is not known) we have a probability den-
sity ρ(U) for U . Following obvious rules, the knowledge
of ρ(U) translates into the joint density ρ(π1, ..., πn) for
maximum-entropy probabilities (30). While this is tech-
nically well-defined, it is not completely clear what is the
meaning of probability density ρ(U) over the average U .
One possibility is that the random variable U is sampled
independently M times (M is necessarily finite), and the
probability density of the empiric mean
1
M
M∑
α=1
u[α], (36)
is identified with ρ(U). This possibility is however prob-
lematic, since it directly relates probability of the empiric
mean with the probability of the average. E.g. if we shall
sample independently M times from (30), then the av-
erage of the empiric mean equals
∫
dU Uρ(U), but the
empiric mean itself is not distributed via ρ(U).
– Given (30), one can regard β as an unknown pa-
rameter, and then apply standard statistical methods for
estimating it [18]. Thus within this solution the max-
imum entropy method is not generalized: its standard
outcome serves as the initial point for applying standard
tools of statistics. This is against the spirit of the maxi-
mum entropy method that is meant to be an independent
inference principle [15].
– Yet another route for solving the problem was dis-
cussed in Ref. [15]. (We mention this possibility, also
because it came out as the first reaction when discussing
the above open problem with practioners of the maxi-
mum entropy method [19].) It amounts to the situation,
where in addition to the empiric mean (36) one also fixes
the second empiric moment 1
M
∑M
α=1 u
2
[α] as the second
constraint in maximizing (16). It is hoped that since
identifying the sample mean (36) with the average U is
not sufficiently precise for a finite M , then fixing the
second moment will account for this lack of precision.
This suggestion was not worked out in detail, but it is
clear that it cannot be relevant to the question we are
interested in. Indeed, its implementation will amount to
fixing two different constraints, i.e. in addition to know-
ing precisely the average U in (29), it will also fix the
second moment U ′ =
∑n
k=1u
2
kpk thereby assuming more
information than the precise knowledge of U entails.
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FIG. 5: Entropy-energy diagram; cf. Fig. 1. Entropy is S and
the minus energy U = −E for 4-level system with energies
[cf. the discussion around (1)]: ε1 = 0, ε2 = 1, ε3 = 2.5, and
ε4 = 10. Maximal (minimal) entropy curves are denoted by
blue (black). All physically acceptable values of entropy and
energy are inside of the domain bounded by blue and black
curves. Red dashed line denotes ln 2. Green dashed curve
shows Uav; see (4).
This figure illustrates the generalized maximum entropy
method discussed in §3 and §4. Brown dashed lines indi-
cate on specific values for U1 and U2 (U2 < U1) which are not
allowed according to axiom 2.
The right [left] blue dashed arrows points from the initial
state (Ui, Si) = (−3.375, ln 2) given by (40) [by (45)] to the
corresponding Nash solutions (43) [(47)] defined over domain
(U ≥ Ui, S ≥ Si) [over (U ≤ Ui, S ≥ Si)].
The interval (U1, U2) = (−8.35,−0.425) is not allowed, be-
cause there are two possibilities for initial points (Ui, Si) =
(−8.35, ln 2) and (Ui, Si) = (−0.425, ln 2), each one produc-
ing its own Nash solution shown by magenta dashed arrows;
cf. discussion around (53).
3.3 Solving the problem via bargaining
Main premises of this solution is that we should simul-
taneously account for both the uncertainty in U and in
S, and that we should account for the duality of opti-
mization, i.e. that the maximum entropy result can be
also obtained via the optimization of U [p] under a fixed
S = S[p].
Let us first of all add an additional restriction in (31):
U ∈ [U1, U2], Uav ≡
1
n
∑n
k=1
uk < U1 < U2, (37)
S(U) ≡ maxp, U=U [p]S[p]. (38)
9The case Uav > U2 is treated similarly to (37) with ob-
vious generalizations explained below. The general case
(31) is more difficult and will be addressed at the end of
the next chapter.
We now know that the maximum entropy solution (30)
can be recovered also by maximizing U over {pk}
n
k=1 for
a fixed entropy. Note that the uncertainty (37) translates
into an uncertainty
S ∈ [S2, S1], S1 ≡ S(U1), S2 ≡ S(U2), (39)
in the maximum entropy. We now take the joint uncer-
tainty domain Ω in the (U, S) diagram. Ω includes all
points (U¯ , S¯), where U¯ ∈ [U1, U2] [see (37)], and where
S¯ ∈ [S2, S1]; see (39). Ω has the structure of the domain
required by Axiom 1, with the (initial) point
(Ui, Si) = (U1, S2) (40)
being the unique anti-Pareto point, i.e. the unique point,
where U and S jointly minimize. Recall the definition of
the anti-Pareto set given in the caption of Table I.
We shall take Axiom 1 in a slightly restricted form as
compared with its original form (Axiom 1) given by (6)
of the main text 1
Axiom 1 ′ : Ui < Uf , Si < Sf . (41)
Axioms 2 and 4 go on as stated in the main text. In
particular, Axiom 2 ensures that Ω is a convex domain,
i.e. that it does not hit the minimum entropy curve.
However, the application of axiom 3 on the affine
covariance needs a restriction, because it is seen from
(40) that the initial point (U1, S2) = (U1, S(U2)) does
transform in the affine way upon affine transformations
U → a−1U + d of U ; cf (7). On the other hand, is ob-
viously intact under affine transformations of S that we
take as the restricted form of Axiom 3 2:
Axiom 3 ′ : S → b−1S + c, b > 0. (42)
It should be clear from our discussion in the main
text—cf. discussions after (8) and after (9)—that Ax-
ioms 1’, 2, 3’ and 4 suffice for deriving thermalization.
1 The reason of this restriction is that for being able to deduce
thermalization using only the restricted affine-covariance (42),
we anyhow need to require the strict inequality Ui < Uf ; cf the
discussion after (8).
2 We emphasize that for the present problem—where we have an
uncertainty interval [U1, U2] for U—the inapplicability of the
affine transformation U → a−1U + d is expected for at least two
reasons. Firstly, the uncertainty interval [U1, U2] does generally
change under this transformation, which indicates on altogether
a different problem. Secondly, the very definition of the ini-
tial point (40) does already connect with the maximum entropy
curve; hence we do not expect the full freedom with respect to
affine transformations to retain.
Note that the discussion after (9) of the main text as-
sumed only affine transformations of U only, but we could
consider affine transformations of S only with the same
success; see Fig. 3. Note as well that instead of affine
transformation (42) we can apply U → a−1U + d [i.e. we
can reformulate axiom (42)], if the initial state (40) is
parametrized as (Ui, Si) = (U1, S2) = (U(S1), S2) via the
inverse function U(S) = maxp, S=S[p]U [p] of S(U).
Axiom 5 will go as stated in the main text and de-
mands symmetry between maximizing S and maximiz-
ing U . Altogether, Axioms 1’, 2, 3’, 4 and 5 suffice for
deriving
argmax(U,S) [(U − U1)(S − S2)] , (43)
as the solution of the problem with uncertainty interval
(37).
3.4 Generalizing the solution to other types of uncertainty
intervals
Uncertainty intervals that instead of (37) hold
U ∈ [U1, U2], U1 < U2 < Uav, (44)
are straightforward to deal with. Now relevant points on
the maximum entropy curve can be reached by entropy
maximization for a fixed U = U [p], or minimizing U [p]
for a fixed entropy S = S[p]. Hence the initial point and
Axiom 1’ now read [cf. (40, 41)]:
(Ui, Si) = (U2, S1), (45)
Axiom 1 ′′ : Ui > Uf , Si < Sf . (46)
Instead of (43), the solution under (44, 45) will read:
argmax(U,S) [(U2 − U)(S − S1)] . (47)
Let us now take the case, where [U1, U2] holds neither
(37), nor (44), i.e. it holds:
U ∈ [U1, U2], U1 < Uav < U2. (48)
Now we do not know a priori whether we should maximize
or minimize over U [p].
We define Ω as above by joining together uncertain-
ties of U and E, i.e. by including all points (U¯ , S¯), where
U¯ ∈ [U1, U2] [see (48)], but where S¯ ∈ (min[S1, S2], lnn).
The latter interval, due to (48), is where the maximum
entropy values are contained. It is clear that generically
Ω has a structure of a right “triangle” formed by by two
legs and a convex curve instead of the hypotenuse. De-
pending on whether S2 < S1 or S1 < S2, we apply to Ω
either (40) with Axiom 1’ (41), or (45) with Axiom 1”
(46). Axioms 2, 3’, 4, 5 apply without changes. Hence
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the initial point and solution reads, respectively in two
regimes:
For S2 < S1 : (Ui, Si) = (U1, S2), (49)
argmax(U,S) [(U − U1)(S − S2)] . (50)
For S1 < S2 : (Ui, Si) = (U2, S1), (51)
argmax(U,S) [(U2 − U)(S − S1)] . (52)
There is only one case, where solutions (50, 52) become
umbiguous:
S2 = S(U2 > 0) = S1 = S(U1 < 0). (53)
Indeed, now interpolating from S2 < S1 will lead to (50),
which is different as compared with interpolating (52)
from S1 < S2. Thus we state that under (53) the prior
information (48) does not suffice for drawing a unique
conclusion with the bargaining method.
Fig. 5 illustrates all the above solution on an entropy-
energy diagram. Two examples of the set Ω are shown
by blue, green (dashed) and red (dashed) lines. Brown
dashed lines show an example of (U1, U2) (U1 < U2),
where the domain of states allowed according to Ax-
iom 1 is not convex: it will cross the minimum entropy
curve Smin(U) denoted by black lines on Fig. 5. Hence
such values of (U1, U2) are not allowed. Fig. 5 shows
two examples of allowed intervals (U1, U2): (U1, U2) =
(−8.35,−3.375) and (U1, U2) = (−3.375,−0.425). The
corresponding values of S1 = S(U1) and S2 = S(U2) are
(ln 2, ln 4) and (ln 4, ln 2). Blue arrows join the initial
states with corresponding Nash solutions (43, 47).
It is seen that for (U1, U2) = (−8.35,−0.425), where
S1 = S2 = ln 2, there are two Nash solutions denoted by
dashed magenta arrows on Fig. 5. For this case (53) the
existing prior information does not allow to single out a
unique solution.
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